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Abstract
This paper establishes the existence of a stationary equilibrium and a procedure to com-
pute solutions to a class of dynamic general equilibrium models with two important features.
First, occupational choice is determined endogenously as a function of heterogeneous agent
type, which is de¯ned by an agent's managerial ability and capital bequest. Heterogeneous
ability is exogenous and independent across generations. In contrast, bequests link gener-
ations and the distribution of bequests evolves endogenously. Second, there is a ¯nancial
market for capital loans with a deadweight intermediation cost and a repayment incentive
constraint. The incentive constraint induces a non-convexity. The paper proves that the
competitive equilibrium can be characterized by the bequest distribution and factor prices,
and uses the monotone mixing condition to ensure that the stationary bequest distribution
that arises from the agent's optimal behavior across generations exists and is unique. The
paper next constructs a direct, non-parametric approach to compute the stationary solution.
The method reduces the domain of the policy function, thus reducing the computational
complexity of the problem.
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11 Introduction
This paper establishes the existence of a stationary equilibrium and a procedure to compute so-
lutions to dynamic general equilibrium models with occupational choice and ¯nancial frictions.
Occupational choice models are common in macroeconomics and there is a voluminous literature
on ¯nancial market frictions.1 These models often have non-convexities which give rise to discon-
tinuous stochastic behavior (e.g., Antunes, Cavalcanti and Villamil, 2006); standard ¯xed point
existence arguments that require continuity are not applicable.2 Hopenhayn and Prescott (1992)
remedy this problem by proving existence of stationary equilibria for stochastically monotone pro-
cesses. They use the Knaster-Tarski ¯xed point theorem to prove existence of ¯xed point mappings
on compact sets of measures that are increasing with respect to a stochastic ordering (monotone).
Our contribution is two-fold. First, we show how the Hopenhayn and Prescott result can be applied
to this class of dynamic general equilibrium models to prove existence of a stationary equilibrium.
Second, we construct a direct, non-parametric approach to compute the stationary solution. Our
method reduces the domain of the policy function, thus reducing the computational complexity of
the problem.
The class of models that we consider have two important features. First, occupational choice
is determined endogenously as a function of heterogeneous agent type. Agents are endowed with
di®erent innate abilities to manage a ¯rm (cf., Lucas, 1978) and di®erent bequests (cf., Antunes
et al., 2006). Heterogeneous ability is exogenous, in the sense that managerial ability is drawn
from a ¯xed distribution, and is independent within and across generations. In contrast, agents
choose consumption and bequests to maximize preferences subject to lifetime wealth. Bequests
thus connect generations across time periods and the distribution of bequests evolves endogenously.
Second, there is a ¯nancial market for capital with two frictions: a deadweight cost to intermediate
loans and an incentive constraint to ensure loan repayment. The incentive constraint induces a
non-convexity. We characterize the competitive equilibrium, and then use a condition derived
by Hopenhayn and Prescott, monotone mixing, to ensure that the optimal stationary bequest
distribution that arises from the stochastic optimization problem exists and is unique.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 contains the model. Section 3 describes optimal
consumption and production behavior. On the production side, agents choose an occupation
(to manage a ¯rm or work) and ¯rm ¯nance (if a manager). Consumers choose consumption and
bequests, where bequests link agents across periods. Section 4 speci¯es the competitive equilibrium
and proves existence of a stationary equilibrium. We show that there is a unique stationary
equilibrium that is fully characterized by a time invariant bequest distribution and associated
equilibrium factor prices. We use the monotone mixing condition from Hopenhayn and Prescott
(1992) Theorem 2. In our context, this condition characterizes two types of mobility in the bequest
distribution: Given that ability is independent across generations, there is a positive probability
that a future descendent of an agent changes occupation (i.e., from worker to entrepreneur or from
entrepreneur to worker). Thus the economy experiences occupation mobility, but from any initial
bequest distribution and any interest rate, convergence to a unique invariant bequest distribution
occurs. Finally, section 5 contains the numerical solution method.
1Examples of occupational choice models are Banerjee and Newman (1993), Erosa (2001), Lloyd-Ellis and Bern-
hardt (2000) and Antunes and Cavalcanti (2005). Examples of models with ¯nancial frictions are Antinol¯ and
Huybens (1998), Betts and Bhattacharya (1998) and Boyd and Smith (1998).
2Standard Brouwer-Kakutani type ¯xed point theorems cannot be used because the ¯xed point mapping is not
necessarily continuous or upper or lower semi-continuous (cf., Krasa and Yannelis (1994)). The Knaster-Tarski
¯xed point theorem is non-topological.
22 The Model
Consider an economy with a continuum of measure one agents who live for one period. Each agent
reproduces another such that population is constant. There is one good each period that can be
used for consumption or production, or left to the next generation as a bequest. Time is discrete
and in¯nite, with t = 0;1;2;:::.
2.1 Preferences, Endowments, Technology and Frictions
2.1.1 Preferences
In period t, agent i's utility is de¯ned over personal consumption and a bequest to o®spring,
denoted by ci
t and bi







u(¢;¢) is twice continuously di®erentiable, strictly concave and increasing in both arguments. We
also assume that the utility function satis¯es the Inada conditions.3 Preferences are for the bequest
and not the o®spring's utility (cf., Banerjee and Newman, 1993).
2.1.2 Heterogeneous Endowments
Each period, agents are distinguished by their publicly known endowments of initial wealth and
ability as entrepreneurs, denoted by (bi
t;xi
t). The bequest is inherited from the previous generation
and generates a given initial bequest distribution ¨(b). Each individual's talent for managing, xi,
is drawn from a continuous cumulative probability distribution function ¡(x), with x 2 [x;x], cf.,
Lucas (1978). Assume that managerial talent is not hereditary. Each individual will choose to be
either a worker or an entrepreneur. Entrepreneurs create jobs and manage ¯rm labor n; workers
are employed by entrepreneurs at wage wt. For notational convenience, in the remainder of the
paper we drop agent superscript i.
2.1.3 Production
Managers operate a technology that uses labor, n, and capital, k, to produce a single consumption
good, y, where
y = xf(k;n): (2)
f(¢;¢) is twice continuously di®erentiable, strictly concave and increasing in both arguments. Func-
tion f(¢;¢) is also homogenous of degree less than one and satis¯es the Inada conditions. Capital
fully depreciates between periods. Managers can operate only one project. The labor and capital
markets are competitive, with prices w and r, respectively.
2.1.4 Capital Market Frictions, ¿ and Á
The capital market has two frictions:
¿: Agents deposit bequest b in a ¯nancial intermediary and earn competitive return r. The
intermediary lends the resources to entrepreneurs. The part of the loan that is fully collateralized
by b costs r; the remainder costs rl = r + ¿, where ¿ is the deadweight cost of intermediation.
3Both Cobb-Douglas and CES utility functions satisfy these restrictions.
3Á: Borrowers cannot commit ex-ante to repay, but there is an exogenous enforcement technol-
ogy. An agent who defaults on a loan incurs penalty Á, which is the percentage of output forfeited
net of wages. This is equivalent to an additive utility punishment, and re°ects the strength of
contract enforcement: As Á ! 1 the penalty is strong; as Á ! 0 it is weak.4
3 Optimal Behavior
3.1 Entrepreneurs
Agents who have su±cient resources and managerial ability to become entrepreneurs choose the
level of capital and the number of employees to maximize pro¯t subject to a technological constraint
and (possibly) a credit market incentive constraint. Consider ¯rst the problem of an entrepreneur
for a given level of capital k and wages w:
¼(k;x;w) = max
n
xf(k;n) ¡ wn: (3)
This yields the labor demand of each entrepreneur: n(k;x;w). This labor demand is di®er-
entiable, continuous in all arguments, increasing in k and x, and decreasing in w. Moreover,
limw!0 n(k;x;w) = 1 and limw!1 n(k;x;w) = 0.
Substituting n(k;x;w) into (3) yields the entrepreneur's pro¯t function for a given level of
capital, ¼(k;x;w). The pro¯t function is di®erentiable, continuous in all arguments, increasing in
k and x, and decreasing in w. We now consider two problems: when initial wealth is su±cient to
fully ¯nance a ¯rm and when it may not be. Let a be the amount of self-¯nanced capital and l be
the amount of funds borrowed from a ¯nancial intermediary.5
Unconstrained Problem. When initial wealth is su±cient for the agent to start her own business




¼(k;x;w) ¡ (1 + r)k: (4)
This gives the optimal physical capital level, k¤(x;w;r), which is continuous in all arguments, and
strictly decreasing in factor prices w and r. It can be also shown that limr!¡1 k¤(x;w;r) = 1 and
limr!1 k¤(x;w;r) = 0. There is no credit market incentive constraint because the ¯rm is entirely
self-¯nanced (i.e., no repayment problem exists).
Constrained Problem. When the entrepreneur's initial wealth may not be su±cient to ¯nance the
¯rm (i.e., b ¸ a and l ¸ 0), the agent will consider loans from the credit market. Since no agent
can commit to repay a loan, these debt contracts must be self-enforcing.
The entrepreneur now maximizes the net income from operating the project:
Problem 2
V (b;x;w;r) = max
b¸a¸0; l¸0
¼(a + l;x;w) ¡ (1 + r)a ¡ (1 + r + ¿)l (5)
4As is common in the literature, we choose a proportional punishment for convenience. See Krasa and Villamil
(2000) and Krasa, Sharma and Villamil (2005) for extended analysis of enforcement and debt contracts.
5Equivalently, a can be interpreted as the part of a loan that is fully collateralized by personal assets and l as
the uncollateralized part.
4subject to:
Á¼(a + l;x;w) ¸ (1 + r + ¿)l: (6)
Feasibility constraint b ¸ a ¸ 0, implicit in the objective, states that the amount of (non-trivial)
self ¯nance, a, cannot exceed the entrepreneur's bequest, b. Problem 2 yields optimal policy
functions a(b;x;w;r) and l(b;x;w;r) that de¯ne the size of each ¯rm,
k(b;x;w;r) = a(b;x;w;r) + l(b;x;w;r):
Restriction (6) is an incentive feasibility constraint which guarantees that ex-ante repayment
promises will be honored, cf., Kehoe and Levine (1993).6
3.1.1 Solutions to the Entrepreneur's Problem
The Lagrangian associated with problem 2 is
L =¼(a + l;x;w) ¡ (1 + r)a ¡ (1 + r + ¿)l
+ ¸(Á¼(a + l;x;w) ¡ (1 + r + ¿)l) + Â(b ¡ a):
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are:
@L
@l
= ¼1(a + l;x;w) ¡ (1 + r + ¿) + ¸(Á¼1(a + l;x;w) ¡ (1 + r + ¿)) · 0; (7)
@L
@a
= ¼1(a + l;x;w) ¡ (1 + r) + ¸Á¼1(a + l;x;w) ¡ Â · 0; (8)
¸(Á¼(a + l;x;w) ¡ (1 + r + ¿)l) = 0; (9)




l = 0; a ¸ 0;
@L
@a
a = 0; ¸ ¸ 0; Â ¸ 0;
plus the incentive compatibility constraint (6) and constraint b ¸ a. Constrained entrepreneurs
are those for which l > 0 holds. It is optimal for entrepreneurs to put their entire wealth in their
project. To see this, assume that constrained entrepreneurs do not put their entire wealth in the
project; that is, 0 · a < b. Then, from (10), Â = 0, and from (7) at equality and (8) it follows that
(1+r)¸+(1+¸)¿ · 0, which is a contradiction. Therefore, if entrepreneurs are credit constrained,
a = b.
There are four cases of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions to consider:
1. 0 < a < b, and l = 0. Then from (9) and (10), Â = ¸ = 0 and
a = k
¤(x;r;w): (11)
2. 0 < a = b, and l = 0, but Á¼(a + l;x;w) ¡ (1 + r + ¿)l > 0. This case arises because
intermediation implies a discrete jump in costs. We have ¸ = 0 and Â (which is non-negative)
given by equation (8) at equality:
Â = ¼1(a + l;x;w) ¡ (1 + r): (12)
The interpretation is straightforward: while the entrepreneur would invest more if she had
a higher bequest, the incremental pro¯t from borrowing is non-positive, as can be seen in
equation (7). The entrepreneur's marginal pro¯t exceeds 1+ r but is smaller than 1+r +¿.
6The restriction requires the percentage of ¯rm pro¯t the ¯nancial intermediary seizes in default to be at least
as high as the repayment obligation.
53. 0 < a = b, and l > 0, but Á¼(a + l;x;w) ¡ (1 + r + ¿)l > 0. Then from (9), ¸ = 0, and by
(7) and (8) at equality it follows that Â = ¿. Therefore,
l + b = k
¤(x;r + ¿;w); (13)
where k¤(x;r + ¿;w) is an unconstrained maximizer of ¼ if the interest rate is rl = r + ¿.
4. 0 < a = b and l > 0, but Á¼(a + l;x;w) ¡ (1 + r + ¿)l = 0. This is the credit-constrained
case. The total loan l(b;x;r;w) is given by the solution to the previous equation with a
substituted by b, and Â = ¿(1 + ¸).
Entrepreneurs invest their entire wealth in their ¯rm as long as b · k¤(x;w;r). This follows
immediately from the fact that the cost of self-¯nance is lower than using a ¯nancial intermediary.
Firm size k of an entrepreneur (b;x) is such that
k · b +
Á
1 + r + ¿
¼(b + l;x;w): (14)
The arguments of k and l are omitted for readability. Thus, ¯rm size is limited by an agent's
inheritance, b, and the capital market frictions, ¿ and Á.
The following lemma characterizes the value function and policy functions:
Lemma 1 For any x 2 [x;x], w > 0 and r > ¡1, the value function V (b;x;w;r) and the
associated policy function l(b;x;w;r) have the following properties:
1. V (b;x;w;r) is continuous and di®erentiable in x, w and r. If x > 0, it is also strictly
increasing in x and strictly decreasing in w and r.
2. For b < k¤(x;w;r), V (b;x;w;r) is continuous, di®erentiable and strictly increasing in b. For
b ¸ k¤(x;w;r), V (b;x;w;r) is constant in b.
3. For credit constrained agents, l(b;x;w;r) is strictly increasing in b for b < k¤(x;w;r);
l(b;x;w;r) = 0 for b ¸ k¤(x;w;r).
Proof. Continuity of V (b;x;w;r) follows from the Maximum Theorem and di®erentiability, cf.,
Theorem 4.11 of Stokey and Lucas (1989). From the Lagrangian and the Envelope Theorem it is
easily seen that, provided x > 0,
V2(b;x;w;r) = ¼2(b + l;x;w)(1 + ¸Á) > 0;
V3(b;x;w;r) = ¼3(b + l;x;w)(1 + ¸Á) < 0;
V4(b;x;w;r) = ¡a ¡ (1 + ¸)l < 0;
We omit the arguments of a, l and ¸ for readability. If b < k¤(x;w;r), the net income from
entrepreneurship would increase if b increased: cases 3 and 4 imply that Â > 0; case 2 implies that
Â = ¼1(b;x;w) ¡ (1 + r), which is positive because ¼1 is decreasing in k and k¤(x;w;r) is found
by equating this expression to 0; therefore, Â > 0. By the Envelope Theorem,
V1(b;x;w;r) = Â > 0:
6When b ¸ k¤(x;w;r), then by the de¯nition of k¤(x;w;r) the net income from entrepreneurship
cannot increase and V1(b;x;w;r) = 0 and l = 0. When agents are credit constrained, the incentive
constraint holds with equality and






1 + r + ¿ ¡ Á¼1(k;x;w)
:
By condition (7), we have that (1 + r + ¿) ¡ Á¼1(k;x;w) =
¼1(k;x;w)¡(1+r+¿)
¸ : Since this is for





¼1(k;x;w) ¡ (1 + r + ¿)
> 0:
3.1.2 Occupational choice
The occupational choice of each agent determines lifetime income. De¯ne ­ = [0;1)£[x;x]. For
any w;r > 0, an agent (b;x) will become an entrepreneur if (b;x) 2 E(w;r), where
E(w;r) = f(b;x) 2 ­ : V (b;x;w;r) ¸ wg: (15)
Let Ec(w;r) denote the complement set of E(w;r) in ­. Obviously, if (b;x) 2 Ec(w;r), then
agents are workers. The following lemma characterizes the occupational choice for a given bequest
and entrepreneurial ability.
Lemma 2 De¯ne be(x;w;r) as the curve in set ­ such that V (b;x;w;r) = w. Then there exists
an x¤(w;r) such that
@be(x;w;r)
@x < 0 for x > x¤(w;r) and
@be(x;w;r)
@x = ¡1 for x = x¤(w;r).
1. For all x > x¤, if b < be(x;w;r), then (b;x) 2 Ec(w;r).
2. For all x > x¤, if b ¸ be(x;w;r), then (b;x) 2 E(w;r).
Proof. We must show that there exists an x¤(w;r) such that
@be(x;w;r)
@x < 0 for x > x¤(w;r), and
@be(x;w;r)
@x = ¡1 for x = x¤(w;r). Observe that at all points where be(x;w;r) is di®erentiable,
V (b;x;w;r) = w







where V1(b;x;w;r) and V2(b;x;w;r) are derived in the proof of Lemma 1.
First consider the case where x < x¤(w;r) for V (b;x;w;r) ¸ w when agents are not borrowing
constrained. We wish to characterize (b;x) 2 Ec(w;r).7 The proof of Lemma 1 establishes that
when agents have b > k¤(x;w;r) and thus are not borrowing constrained, V1(b;x;w;r) = 0. As
7Note that if V (b;x;w;r) < w it is optimal for the agent to become a worker and (b;x) 2 Ec(w;r).
7a consequence,
@be(x;w;r)
@x = ¡1 for x = x¤(w;r). The critical x¤(w;r) is clearly independent of b,
which implies that agents prefer to be workers rather than managers for x < x¤(w;r) even when
V (b;x;w;r) ¸ w.
Now we wish to characterize (b;x) 2 E(w;r). Consider the case where agents are borrowing







because the proof of Lemma 1 establishes that V1(b;x;w;r) > 0 and V2(b;x;w;r) > 0. It follows
immediately that for all x > x¤ we have
@be(x;w;r)
@x < 0. If b < be(x;w;r), then (b;x) 2 Ec(w;r) and
if b ¸ be(x;w;r) we have that (b;x) 2 E(w;r).
Lemma 2 indicates that agents are workers when the quality of their project is low, i.e., x <
x¤(w;r). For x ¸ x¤(w;r) agents may become entrepreneurs, depending on whether they are
credit constrained or not. For very low bequests agents might be workers even though their
entrepreneurial ability is higher than x¤(w;r). The negative association between be(x;w;r) and x
indicates that managers with better managerial ability need a lower level of initial wealth to run
a ¯rm. This is intuitive since pro¯ts are increasing in managerial ability.
3.2 Consumers
In period t, the lifetime wealth of an agent characterized by (bt;xt) is given by
Yt = Y (bt;xt;wt;rt) = maxfwt;V (bt;xt;wt;rt)g + (1 + rt)bt: (16)
Lifetime wealth is thus a function of agent-speci¯c bt and xt, and economy-wide wt and rt. Given
lifetime wealth, agents choose consumption and bequests to maximize preferences (1). This prob-
lem de¯nes optimal policies for consumption, ct = c(Yt), and bequest, bt+1 = b(Yt). Policy functions
c(¢) and b(¢) are clearly continuous, di®erentiable, and increasing in Yt. We assume that bequests
cannot be negative because parents cannot borrow from their descendants future income (cf.,
Banerjee and Newman, 1993 or Lloyd-Ellis and Bernhardt, 2000).
4 Competitive Equilibrium
We now de¯ne and prove existence of a competitive equilibrium. We use Hopenhayn and Prescott
(1992), Theorem 2 to establish the existence of a stationary equilibrium through a stochastic
monotonicity condition. They use the Knaster-Tarski ¯xed point theorem to prove existence of
¯xed point mappings on compact sets of measures that are increasing with respect to a stochastic
ordering (monotone). As Hopenhayn and Prescott show, stochastic monotonicity arises in eco-
nomic models from monotone decision rules, which result from agents' optimizing behavior. They
establish a monotone mixing condition under which the optimal stationary policies in a dynamic
stochastic problem are unique. The intuition is as follows. Consider two bequest distributions. A
monotone mapping and its iterates preserve the ordering of the two distributions, but after ¯nitely
many iterations some mass in the distributions reverse order. The monotone mixing condition
implies that this can only occur in the limit if the two distributions coincide.
84.1 Notation and De¯nitions
We begin by introducing some useful notation:
Z = [b;b] is the set of possible bequests.
(Z;B) is a measurable space with Borel algebra B for the set.
¤(Z;B) is the set of all possible probability measures de¯ned on measurable space (Z;B).8
For any (bt;A) in (Z;B), measure Pt de¯nes a non-stationary transition probability function
Pt(bt;A) = Prfbt+1 2 Ajbtg:
B(Z) is the set of real-valued bounded functions de¯ned on Z.
h : B(Z) ! B(Z) is a bounded and non-decreasing function.
Function Pt assigns a probability to event A for the descendant of an agent with bequest bt who
does not yet know xt. We must determine the probability that next period's bequest lies in set A,
given that the current bequest is bt. Function Pt is important because it a®ects the law of motion




The following de¯nitions will be useful:
De¯nition 1 Let (Z;B) be a measurable space. A transition function is a function P : Z £B !
[0;1] such that
1. for each z 2 Z, P(z;¢) is a probability measure on (Z;B); and
2. for each A 2 B, P(¢;A) is a B-measurable function.
De¯nition 2 For any B-measurable function h, de¯ne Th by (Th)(b) =
R
h(b0)P(b;db0), 8b 2 Z,
where operator T : B(Z) ! B(Z) is associated with transition function P.
De¯nition 3 For any probability measure ¸ on (Z;B), de¯ne (T ¤¸)(A) =
R
P(b;A)¸(db), 8A 2 B,
where operator T ¤ : ¤(Z;B) ! ¤(Z;B) and ¸ ! T ¤(¸) is associated with transition function P.
De¯nition 4 A transition function P on (Z;B) is monotone if the associated operator T has the
property that for every nondecreasing function h : Z ! R, the function Th is also nondecreasing.
De¯nition 1 establishes a 1-step transition function; we will generalize this to an n-step tran-
sition function for a sequence of bequest shocks in n successive periods. De¯nition 2 gives the
expected value of h next period given that the current state is b. De¯nition 3 gives the probability
that the state next period is in A, given that the current state is drawn according to ¸. Operators
T and T ¤ are well-de¯ned (see Stokey and Lucas (1989), Corollary and Theorem 8.2 respectively,
p. 215). In Proposition 5 the law of motion will be de¯ned recursively by applying operator T ¤ on
¨0 to get the n-step transition function.
We now de¯ne an equilibrium.
De¯nition 5 Given distributions ¡ and ¨t, an equilibrium at date t is a wt, rt, n(x;wt;rt),
l(b;x;wt;rt), a(b;x;wt;rt), k(b;x;wt;rt), ct = c(¢), and bt+1 = b(¢) such that:
8¨t, which speci¯es the probability of each event in B at time t, belongs to ¤(Z;B).
9A. Given wt, rt, an agent of type (b;x) chooses an occupation to maximize lifetime wealth, (16).
B. Given wt, rt, the technology constraint and frictions, entrepreneurs choose n to maximize
pro¯ts, (3).
C. l(b;x;wt;rt) and a(b;x;wt;rt) solve (5) and k(b;x;wt;rt) = a(b;x;wt;rt) + l(b;x;wt;rt).
D. Given lifetime wealth, (16), each agent maximizes utility, (1).













In the model the only connection between periods is bequests.9 Thus, we wish to show that there
is a unique stationary equilibrium summarized by (¨;r¤;w(r¤)). Speci¯cally, we must establish
the existence of a unique time invariant distribution ¨ and associated equilibrium wage w and
interest rate r, such that from any initial distribution ¨0, the operator T ¤¨t converges to a unique
¨. Thus, competitive equilibrium conditions A through F are summarized by ¨, w, and r.
4.2 Preliminary Results
We ¯rst show that for any ¯nite interest rate r, there exists a positive and unique wage rate in
each period t that clears the labor market.
Lemma 3 Assume that ability cumulative distribution function ¡ is continuous on [x;x], free
disposal of bequests, and an interest rate r 2 I, where I = [¡1; ¹ r] and ¹ r < 1. Then:
1. There exists 0 < w(r) < 1, continuous in r, that clears the labor market.
2. There exists w(r) > 0 such that w(r) · w(r) for all bequest probability measures ¨.
3. There exists w > 0 such that w · w(r) for all bequest probability measures ¨ and interest
rates r 2 I.
9Bequest bt+1 is chosen optimally in the consumer's problem and connects generations. Bequest distribution ¨t
thus evolves endogenously across periods. In contrast to bequests, managerial talent xt is not inherited; realization
xt is drawn independently across agents and generations from the ¯xed distribution ¡ each period.
10Proof. The lower bound of interval I is ¡1. Any lower interest rate would imply a negative
end-of-period value for initial inheritance; agents who chose to be workers would dispose of b.




(1 + n(b;x;r;w))¨(db)¡(dx) ¡ 1:
Functions n(b;x;r;w) and V (b;x;r;w) are continuous in w and r (see Lemma 1). Probability dis-
tribution ¨¡ has no points with positive mass probability, which implies that the measure of set
E(r;w) varies smoothly.10 Therefore, function LED(r;w) is continuous. In addition, n(b;x;r;w)
and V (b;x;r;w) are strictly decreasing in w. As w ! 0, V (b;x;r;w) is unbounded and no
agent wishes to become a worker. It follows that LED(r;w) > 0. When w increases su±ciently,
LED(r;w) < 0, since all agents wish to become workers. Therefore, by continuity of LED(r;w),
there must be some 0 < w(r) < 1 such that LED(r;w(r)) = 0. Function w(r) is continuous by
continuity of LED(r;w).
We now show w · w(r) · w(r) for some w;w(r) > 0: Consider an initial bequest distribution
that assigns a zero bequest to all agents. Assume that at rate r, the intermediary can borrow abroad
any amount needed to ful¯ll the internal demand for capital or lend any excess supply of capital. We
have shown that equilibrium wage rate w(r) is positive and ¯nite. Since the wage rate is positive,
next period's bequests will all be positive. Therefore, the set of possible occupational choices
cannot shrink, and may expand. This implies that for wage w(r), excess demand is nonnegative,
LED(r;w(r)) ¸ 0, which in turn means that for this new bequest distribution the wage rate that
clears the labor market is higher than w(r). This function is again continuous. Consequently,
w(r) is the lowest equilibrium wage rate when the interest rate is r. By continuity of w(r) and
compactness of I we can de¯ne w > 0 such that w · w(r) for all r in I.
Given that the wage rate is positive, we can show that for any interest rate r 2 I the distribution





The fact that the marginal utility of bequests is positive and unbounded as bequests go to zero,
and that the same is true for consumption, implies that f°(Y ); 8Y 2 R+g has a supremum smaller
than 1, which we designate by °, and an in¯mum higher that 0. From here on, de¯ne the upper
bound of I as r = (1 ¡ °)¡1 ¡ 1 ¡ ", where " is a small positive constant.
Lemma 4 Assume that ¡ is continuous on [x;x], free disposal of bequests, and r 2 I, where
I = [¡1; ¹ r]. For any r 2 I and initial bequest probability measure ¨0 such that each agent receives
a positive bequest, the set of possible bequests Z is compact.
Proof. We wish to show that Z is closed and bounded. The bequest function of an agent of type
(b;x) is, in case she is an entrepreneur,
g(b;x;r;w) = b(V (b;x;r;w) + (1 + r)b); (17)
where b(¢) is the bequest function (see section 3.2). Function g is strictly decreasing in w for any
entrepreneur.
10Although ¨ might have positive mass probability points, ¨¡ does not because ¡ is continuous.
11Consider an upper bound. An upper bound for any \sustainable" bequest is b(r) such that
b(r) = g(b(r);x;r;w(r)) = (1 ¡ °(Y ))Y : (18)
This is the bequest that, at the lowest wage possible, the most productive entrepreneur will leave
to the next generation given that she received the same bequest. Suppose that r = ¡1. Then by
(11), the unconstrained level of capital is in¯nite. All entrepreneurs will invest all their bequest
and some might resort to borrowing.
Function g(b;x;¡1;w(¡1)) is strictly increasing in b, since by the Envelope Theorem its deriva-
tive with respect to b is g1(b;x;¡1;w(¡1)) = b0(Y )(Â + 1 + r)jr=¡1 = b0(Y )Â, where we de¯ned
Y = V (b;x;r;w) + (1 + r)b. Given that agents prefer a higher bequest, Â > 0, and b0(¢) > 0 (see
section 3.2), the claim follows.
Now we consider what happens to the function as b ! 0 and b ! 1.
(i) When b ! 0, the entrepreneur will be in either case 3 or 4 of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions in
the entrepreneur's problem in section 3.1.1.11 It follows immediately from case 3 that when ¸ = 0
and (7) and (8) hold at equality, then Â equals the marginal cost of funds, ¿; as for case 4, when
(7), (8) and the incentive compatibility constraint hold at equality, then Â equals ¿(1 + ¸). So,
for both cases, Â ¸ ¿. Moreover, limb!0 g(b;x;¡1;w(¡1)) > 0, as the entrepreneur's credit limit
is always strictly positive. To see this, notice that (14) at equality with r = ¡1, b = 0 and k = l
yields ¿l = Á¼(l;x;w(¡1)). Since ¼(0;x;w(¡1)) = 0 and ¼ is increasing in l, and the limit of ¼1
is in¯nity as l goes to zero, the equation has a strictly positive solution, which is the credit limit.
(ii) When b ! 1, case 2 applies because the entrepreneur does not borrow. Case 2 establishes
that the marginal pro¯t of funds is ¼1, which goes to zero as b goes to in¯nity.12
Results (i) and (ii) imply that the slope and intercept of g(b;x;¡1;w(¡1)) at the origin are
strictly positive and, as b increases, the slope decreases to zero. It follows that equation b =
g(b;x;¡1;w(¡1)) holds for some su±ciently large b. Thus, there is a ¯nite upper bound b(¡1)
for all bequests when r = ¡1. Finally, b(r) is continuous by continuity of V (b;x;r;w), and
compactness of I implies that there is a b = maxr2Ifb(r)g.
By the same argument, there is a positive lower bound for all possible bequests, b.
4.3 Existence of a Unique, Stationary Equilibrium
We now prove monotonicity of the bequest distribution. Since the state space is compact, this
implies the existence of a stationary distribution (see Corollary 2 of Hopenhayn and Prescott
(1992)). Speci¯cally, Corollary 2 requires Z to have a minimum element, which follows from
compactness, and T ¤ to be increasing, which follows from monotonicity (see our De¯nition 4). We
also show that the transition probability function satis¯es the monotonic mixing condition. We
then apply Theorem 2 of Hopenhayn and Prescott (1992) to show uniqueness and convergence of
the stationary distribution.
Proposition 5 Let the conditions of Lemma 4 be satis¯ed. Then for any r 2 I there exists a
unique invariant distribution ¨. In addition, for any initial bequest distribution ¨0, the bequest
distribution converges to ¨.
11Cases 1 and 2 involve no borrowing, so as b goes to zero the scale of the ¯rm goes to zero and the entrepreneur
will be better o® if she borrows. We are abstracting from the occupational consequences of lowering b { the agent
at some point might prefer becoming a worker.
12As b increases, ¼1 decreases until it reaches ¿ (case 3). As b increases beyond the level de¯ned by (13), case 2
applies and ¼1 falls below ¿, thus making it unpro¯table to borrow.
12Proof. Lemma 4 establishes that set Z is compact. From De¯nition 3, 8A 2 B operator T ¤ :





We wish to show that operator T ¤ has a unique ¯xed point T ¤¨ = ¨ for any Borel subset A 2 B,
given the initial bequest distribution ¨0.13 Of course, T ¤¨t = ¨t+1.
In order to ¯nd a ¯xed point, ¯rst note that wt is well de¯ned for every distribution ¨t and
any r 2 I. Second, bt+1 = maxfwt + (1 + r)bt;g(bt;xt;r;wt)g, which is increasing in bt (cf., (16))
and Z is compact (cf., Lemma 4), therefore it has a minimum element. Operator (Th)(bt) = R
h(bt+1)Pt(bt;dbt+1), de¯ned for any h, is the conditional expectation of function h at t + 1 given
that the state at t is bt. For any wage rate wt, g(bt;xt;r;wt) is bounded and increasing in bt and
xt+1 is independent of bt. Then the conditional expectation of h(bt+1) on bt is also increasing and
bounded provided that h is increasing.14 Function Th is increasing, thus T ¤ is increasing and Pt
is a monotonic transition function (cf., De¯nition 4 and Stokey and Lucas, 1989, pages 220 and
379). Because Z is compact and T ¤ is increasing, the conditions of Corollary 2 of Hopenhayn and
Prescott (1992) hold and there is a ¯xed point for map T ¤.
We now show that Pt satis¯es the monotone mixing condition. De¯ne the n-step transition
function beginning at t, Pt+n(bt;A) = Prfbt+n 2 Ajbtg. We must show that transition function
Pt+n satis¯es, for all t,
Pt+N(b;[ba;b]) > ² and Pt+N(b;[b;ba]) > ²
for some ba 2 Z, ² > 0, and N 2 N.15 We omit subscript t and ¯x r for simplicity and without
loss of generality. Let w be the wage associated with the ¯xed point of map T ¤, ¨. De¯ne:
b = b(w + (1 + r)b): minimum stationary bequest;
ba = b(w + (1 + r)b) + % for some small % > 0.
There are two types of mobility in distribution ¨: We must show there is a positive probability that
the Nth descendent of an agent with b = b receives a bequest above ba and that an agent with b = b
receives a bequest below ba. An agent's descendants will have bequests in the neighborhood of b
in ¯nite time because they will earn at least the wage rate. Since the measures of sets E(r;w) and
Ec(r;w) are non-zero and constant (because the labor market clears with wage w), and ability is
independent across generations, we now show there is a positive probability of occupation change:
(i) Worker to Entrepreneur: Suppose by way of contradiction that agents with ability in the
neighborhood of x and bequests in the neighborhood of b cannot have descendants that become
entrepreneurs. Since all agents' descendants face a positive probability of having a bequest in
the neighborhood of b in ¯nite time due to successive low x's, this implies that the measure of
agents (workers) in the neighborhood of b is 1, a contradiction to the fact that E(r;w) has a
non-zero measure. Therefore, agents in the neighborhood of (x;b) have descendants that become
entrepreneurs. Moreover, this can occur in the following generation. This implies that they can
13(T¤¨t)(A) is the probability that next period's bequest lies in A, given the current bequest distribution. Map
T¤ is well de¯ned, i.e., (T¤¨t)(A) 2 ¤(Z;B). Stokey and Lucas (1989) Theorem 8.2 shows T¤ : ¤(Z;B) ! ¤(Z;B).
14Given the equilibrium wage rate wt, an agent's descendant is never worse o® in terms of the expected value of
any increasing function of bt+1 if, for any db > 0, the agent's state were bt + db instead of bt.
15In our context the monotone mixing condition means that there is a positive probability that the Nth descendent
changes from a worker to an entrepreneur or vice versa due to independent draws of random ability x. The N-step
transition function, Pt+N, indicates the probability of going from point bt to set A in exactly N periods. See Stokey
(1988), p. 219.
13also have bequests higher than ba > b as long as they have a su±ciently high x, in which case they
have a credit limit su±ciently high to become entrepreneurs.
(ii) Entrepreneur to Worker: Starting from b = b, a succession of low x's leaves the agent's
descendants with bequests lower than ba. They will become workers and remain so until they get
a su±ciently high x.
The conditions of Hopenhayn and Prescott (1992), Theorem 2 are satis¯ed, thus there exists a
unique time invariant distribution ¨ and associated equilibrium wage w, such that from any initial
distribution ¨0 and any interest rate r 2 I, the operator T ¤¨t converges to a unique ¨.
Now, we show that each invariant distribution ¨ is associated with a positive and unique pair
(w¤(r¤);r¤) that clears the labor and capital markets.
Proposition 6 Let the conditions of Proposition 5 be satis¯ed. Then there exists a ¯nite and
unique interest rate r¤ 2 I that clears the capital market in the stationary equilibrium. Triplet
(¨;r¤;w(r¤)) completely characterizes the stationary equilibrium.







We must prove that this is zero for some pair (r¤;w(r¤)), where w(r¤) is the stationary equilibrium
wage rate, as established in Proposition 5. Notice that independence across generations and
continuity of ¡ implies that function KED(r;w) is continuous.
Suppose again that r = ¡1. Then either KED(¡1;w(¡1)) is non-positive or positive. In the
¯rst case, total bequests are enough to ¯nance total demand for capital. The equilibrium interest
rate is r¤ = ¡1 and bequests are discarded because they have no value at the end of the period.
For the second case, that is, KED(¡1;w(¡1)) is positive, we need to show that, as the interest






1 ¡ (1 ¡ °)(1 + r)
;
since all agents receive at least w(r) ¸ w and 1¡° is the lowest possible share of income transmit-
ted to the next generation. As r ! (1¡°)¡1¡1¡", the second term on the right-hand side of this
expression can be made arbitrarily large in absolute terms.16 Since bequests become uniformly
arbitrarily large, the ¯rst term grows to the point where none of the entrepreneurs is ever con-
strained and capital is always at the unconstrained optimum for all entrepreneurs. Therefore, for
su±ciently small ", the right-hand side of the inequality is negative, implying that KED(r;w(r)) is
negative. We have shown that, for the case when KED(r;w(r)) > 0 with r = ¡1, KED(r;w(r)) < 0
as r ! (1 ¡ °)¡1 ¡ 1 ¡ ". By continuity, there must be some r¤ such that KED(r¤;w(r¤)) is zero.
16In (20), given x,
R
b¨(db) is the supply of loans (see condition F in De¯nition 5). The corresponding term
in the inequality is the smallest supply of loans: the bequest if all agents were workers who received the lowest
possible wage, w, at the lowest transmission rate, 1 ¡ °. To compute this bequest, observe that for such a worker
bt+1 = (1 ¡ °)(w + (1 + r)bt). In a stationary equilibrium, bt+1 = bt and the result follows.
14It remains to show that for each stationary distribution ¨, the pair (r¤;w¤(r¤)) is unique.
De¯ne b and b as the lower and upper bounds of the support of the stationary bequest distribution,
respectively. They are de¯ned implicitly by the following equations:
b =(1 ¡ °(Yl))Yl (21)
b =(1 ¡ °(Yu))Yu ; (22)
where Yl = ((1 + r)b + w¤) and Yu = ((1 + r)b + V (b;x;r¤;w¤)). A worker whose ancestors have
been workers will have bequests in the neighborhood of b. An entrepreneur with ability in the
neighborhood of x whose ancestors have had ability in the neighborhood of x will have bequests
in the neighborhood of b.
Since the stationary equilibrium distribution of b is unique, any change in pair (r¤;w¤) that is
still a stationary equilibrium must not change the bequest distribution. Hence, b and b must not
change. Therefore, equation (22) de¯nes a price schedule w(r) consistent with the same stationary


































Another implication of a unique stationary equilibrium distribution is the fact that the en-
trepreneurs' pro¯ts along the distribution in (b;x) must not change. Therefore, in the neighbor-
hood of (b;x), the value function of entrepreneurs must not change as we change the prices. This
implies that V (b;x;r;w) must be constant for any change in prices consistent with a unique sta-















If the equilibrium prices are not unique, this derivative must equal (23). This is possible only if
b = 0, a contradiction to the fact that w¤(r¤) > 0.
5 Numerical Solution Method
We use a direct, non-parametric approach to compute the stationary solution (¨;r¤;w¤(r¤)). A
non-parametric approach, in contrast to a parametric approach, makes no assumptions about the
the shape of the endogenously determined bequest distribution ¨. As we show, provided the
(exogenous) ability cumulative distribution ¡ is continuous, ¨ is stationary and unique. However,
it might be a complicated function of the model parameters and exogenous functions, particularly
when it is the only link between generations and we have the non-convex enforcement restriction.
This is a powerful justi¯cation for not using parametric speci¯cations of ¨. The method may also
be used to compute the equilibrium during the transition to the stationary equilibrium.
The strategy is as follows. Consider a large number of ex ante identical individuals. Suppose
that each of these individuals has a ¯xed bequest and entrepreneurial ability, as well as policy
functions. Individuals interact in a \synthetic" marketplace. Moreover, ¯nancial intermediaries
and entrepreneurs interact so as to clear the capital market. Once the equilibrium bequest distri-
bution and wage and interest rates are determined, we calculate next period's initial wealth and
15repeat the procedure. The stationary distribution of bequests, wage and interest rate are found
when they vary less than a small amount from one period to the next.
In order to solve the equilibrium numerically it is important to de¯ne parametric forms for the
utility function, production function, and ability distribution. We use the following functions:
1. Utility function: u(c;b) = c°b1¡°, with ° 2 (0;1).
2. Production function: f(k;n) = k®n¯, with ®; ¯ > 0; and ® + ¯ < 1:
3. Ability distribution: ¡(x) = x
1
², with ² > 0. This distribution implies that x 2 [0;1].
One must also de¯ne the value of six parameters: (°;®;¯;²;Á;¿). Antunes et al. (2006) choose
the following parameter values (°;®;¯;²;Á;¿) = (0:94;0:35;0:55;4:422;0:26;0:1907). See Antunes
et al. (2006) for a full explanation of how these parameters were calibrated and how the model
matches key statistics of the United States economy.
5.1 Determining prices
Policy functions are the solutions to the static problem (16), where V (b;x;w;r) is given by (5).
This, in principle, points to a four-dimensional domain for the policy functions. However, it can
be shown that two of the dimensions can be collapsed into one, as the entrepreneur's problem can
be written as a function of h = x
w¯, so V (b;x;w;r) = ¹ V (b;h;r). This reduces the computational
complexity of the problem.
For a given initial bequest distribution, ¨0(b), the equilibrium wage and interest rate are found
by iteration. Start with an initial value for prices, w0 and r0. Given these prices, agents decide
whether to become entrepreneurs or workers based on (16) and (5). For instance, if agent j is






, and compares it with w0. She becomes an entrepreneur if V (bj;hj;r0) > w0, and a worker
if V (bj;hj;r0) < w0. The individual is indi®erent between both occupational choices if equality
prevails.
We choose a large number N of workers and determine their occupational choices through this
process. Denote by Iw
j and Ie
j the indicator functions for workers and entrepreneurs, respectively.











where n(b;h;r) is the policy function for labor demand. Likewise, capital excess supply as a











where k(b;h;r) is the policy function for capital.



















16where the alm are suitably chosen parameters17 and 0 < ¾ · 1 is a weight attached to the previous
iteration. This parameter is used to avoid excessive °uctuation of successive iterations. The process
is repeated until X0 and Y0 are su±ciently low.
5.2 Policy functions
This method is not feasible if the policy functions are recalculated every time that prices are
updated, as this would involve solving an optimization problem in each iteration. Execution time
would then become larger by one or two orders of magnitude.
This problem is solved using interpolation. For this purpose, ¯rst calculate the policy functions
k and n (and the value function V ) for a grid of the (b;h;r) space. These functions are used
unchanged in the entire algorithm. This removes the computational burden from each iteration to
the beginning of the algorithm. In each iteration, the program performs a table lookup instead of
a complete optimization algorithm.
5.3 The stationary bequest distribution
The stationary bequest distribution is found by computing equilibria for successive generations.
The algorithm is stopped when prices remain stable from one generation to the next. Given the
convergence properties of the model, stable prices imply a stable bequest distribution.18
It should be emphasized that a direct Monte Carlo approach is not easily applicable to our
model. Stachurski (2005) analyzes the general framework where the endogenous variable Xt, which
takes values in S ½ Rk, is given by the recursive relation Xt = Ht(Xt¡1;Wt), where the shocks Wt
are iid and taken from a known distribution, and the initial distribution of the endogenous variable
is also known.19 It would in principle be possible to draw sequences of shocks (W1;:::;WT) so
that, using the recursive law above, one could obtain the distribution of XT. (This approach could
even be improved if the conditional of Xt given Xt¡1 were known.) This process is not feasible in
our case because in each period Ht depends on the equilibrium prices of factors, and there is not a
direct method to calculate them without complete knowledge of the distribution function of Xt¡1.
(For the same reason, it is not possible to easily calculate the distribution of Xt conditional on
Xt¡1.) In other words, in order to calculate Ht, we need to know the entire distribution of Xt¡1.
This suggests that an agent-based approach, such as ours, is more appropriate.
Figure 1 presents the sorted bequests in two consecutive periods plotted against each other.
The curve is approximately a straight line, as expected. From this we see that the distribution
is stable. The shape of the stationary bequest distribution is depicted in Figure 2. The straight
section is a consequence of the uniform wage rate.
17We assume a12 = a21 = 0 throughout.
18This does not imply that an agent always gets the same bequest.
19In our case, Xt is bt and Wt is xt.

































Figure 1: Values of bt (sorted) plotted against bt+1 (sorted). N = 100000, only 10000 depicted.
6 Concluding Remarks
We have proved the existence of a stationary equilibrium for a class of dynamic general equilibrium
models with agent heterogeneity, which leads to endogenous occupational choice, and loan market
frictions. The loan repayment incentive constraint induces a non-convexity which makes standard
¯xed point arguments that require continuity inapplicable. We obtain two main theoretical results.
Under the conditions stated, the ¯rst proposition proves the existence of a unique steady-state
equilibrium for any ¯xed interest rate which clears the labor market. Under the conditions stated,
the second proposition proves existence of a unique steady-state equilibrium that clears the capital
market and the labor market. We also describe how to compute the steady state solution.
The second proposition is of additional interest because it makes it possible to extend the
literature on occupational choice models with ¯nancial market imperfections in an important way.
The existing literature, for example Banerjee and Newman (1993), Lloyd-Ellis and Bernhardt
(2000), Antunes and Cavalcanti (2005) and Amaral and Quintin (2006), assumes a small open
economy. This case corresponds to our ¯rst proposition where the interest rate is given. Our
second proposition applies to the alternative case of an endogenously determined interest rate,
which to our knowledge has been neglected. In Antunes et al. (2006) we show that this general
equilibrium e®ect is important, both qualitatively and quantitatively, and that it has an important
implication for policy: It suggests that ¯nancial reform (e.g., reforms designed to strengthen
contract enforcement such as bankruptcy law revisions) should be accompanied by policies which
increase capital mobility, which a®ect the interest rate. Otherwise, the ¯nancial reforms will often
have a minor quantitative e®ect on e±ciency due to general equilibrium adjustments.











































Figure 2: Lorenz curve of the stationary bequest distribution.
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